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Abstract 
Depression is linked to deficits in cognitive control and a host of other cognitive impairments 
arise as a consequence of these deficits. Despite of their important role in depression, there are no 
mechanistic models of cognitive control deficits in depression. In this paper we propose how 
these deficits can emerge from the interaction between motivational and cognitive processes. We 
review depression-related impairments in key components of motivation along with new 
cognitive neuroscience models that focus on the role of motivation in the decision-making about 
cognitive control allocation. Based on this review we propose a unifying framework which 
connects motivational and cognitive control deficits in depression. This framework is rooted in 
computational models of cognitive control and offers a mechanistic understanding of cognitive 
control deficits in depression.  
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Introduction 
Depression1 profoundly influences the way in which we process information and think about 
ourselves, others, and the world around us. An individual suffering from depression will take a 
longer time to disengage from the processing of negative information and will experience 
difficulties in suppressing irrelevant thoughts, or shifting attention from one task to another in 
order to reach a goal. Such issues will make it difficult for that individual to regulate emotions 
and adapt to the changing environment. This is why cognitive processes are a crucial target for 
understanding and treating depression (Clark and Beck, 2010; Kaser et al., 2017).  
Depression is characterized by impairments in attention, memory, and cognitive control 
(Millan et al., 2012). Cognitive control deficits are related to central features of depression such 
as concentration and memory problems and a host of other cognitive impairments and biases 
arise as a consequence of these deficits (Disner et al., 2011; Gotlib and Joormann, 2010). 
Cognitive control is crucial in motivated, goal-directed behavior. It represents a set of processes 
that allow for the flexible adaptation of cognition and behavior in accordance with our current 
goals (Botvinick and Cohen, 2014; Friedman and Miyake, 2017; Shenhav et al., 2013). For 
example, cognitive control is necessary if we want to inhibit negative thoughts and shift our 
attention to a new task. Impairments in such control processes are found across a wide range of 
psychiatric disorders (Millan et al., 2012), and they have been consistently linked with depressive 
symptoms (Snyder, 2013). However, our understanding of cognitive control in depression is 
limited in several important ways. 
Current understanding of cognitive control in depression is predominately descriptive and 
research is focused on detecting deficits in specific cognitive processes, such as the inhibition of 
                                                           
1 Throughout this paper we use the term depression to denote the Major Depressive Disorder.  
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negative material (for a review see: Grahek et al., 2018). In spite of the important progress in 
charting cognitive control deficits related to depressive symptoms, the origin of these deficits 
remains poorly understood. It is not known why deficits in cognitive control develop, or how they 
are maintained. Most of the existing models view cognitive control deficits in depression as the 
reduced ability to exert control and do not offer mechanisms through which these deficits emerge. 
Currently there is a strong need for the development of a more mechanistic account of cognitive 
control deficits in depression. A mechanistic account moves beyond identification and 
description of a phenomenon. It does so by appealing to a mechanism: a structure defined by its 
components, their organization and interactions, which produce a phenomenon (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen, 2005; Machamer et al., 2000). In this paper we argue that recent developments in 
research on motivation and cognitive control, as well as the development of computational 
theories of cognitive control, can contribute to such a mechanistic understanding of control 
deficits in depression. The use of such theories to explain cognitive control deficits in depression, 
instead of developing new models specific for psychopathology, holds the promise of advancing 
the understanding of cognitive control in both healthy and depressed individuals.  
In this paper we first review disparate literatures on motivation and cognitive control in 
depression. Further, we describe computational models of cognitive control and demonstrate how 
they can be used to link motivation and cognition in depression. On the basis of this review, we 
rely on a computational model of cognitive control to propose a framework in which cognitive 
control deficits in depression arise from alterations in crucial components of motivation: reward 
anticipation, effort costs, and estimates of environment controllability. This view offers the 
possibility for re-conceptualizing depression-related cognitive control deficits. Instead of a 
reduced ability to employ control, we propose that control deficits can be viewed as changes in 
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the decision-making process underlying cognitive control allocation. This decision-making 
process relies on crucial components of motivation: reward anticipation, effort, and estimates of 
the ability to control the environment. We use simulations of two cognitive tasks to demonstrate 
how this framework can be used to derive behavioral predictions about the impact of 
motivational impairments on cognitive control. 
Cognitive control in depression 
Deficits in cognitive control have not only been documented in clinically depressed 
individuals (Snyder, 2013), but also in patients in remission (Demeyer et al., 2012; Levens and 
Gotlib, 2015), and in at-risk populations (Derakshan et al., 2009; Owens et al., 2012). Meta-
analytic evidence from behavioral studies suggests that depression is reliably linked to deficits in 
cognitive control (Rock et al., 2014; Snyder, 2013). There is also emerging evidence that 
cognitive remediation training aimed at improving cognitive control processes reduces depressive 
symptoms (for a review see: Koster, Hoorelbeke, Onraedt, Owens, & Derakshan, 2017). At the 
neural level, depressive symptoms have been linked to changes in the activity of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & 
Putnam, 2002; Gotlib & Hamilton, 2008; Pizzagalli, 2011). Meta-analyses of the neuroimaging 
studies also point to the differences between healthy and depressed individuals, both in activation 
in these two regions during cognitive tasks (McTeague et al., 2017), as well as in the gray matter 
volume (Goodkind et al., 2015). However, the neuroimaging studies have often been conducted 
on very small samples, and there is considerable heterogeneity in their results (e.g., Müller et al., 
2016; for a discussion see: Barch & Pagliaccio, 2017). Multiple authors have proposed that the 
reduced activity in the dlPFC and the ACC is related to the diminished ability of depressed 
individuals to employ cognitive control (Disner et al., 2011; Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007).  
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Cognitive control processes are considered to be an important vulnerability factor for 
depression. Cognitive impairments in attention, interpretation, and memory may arise as a 
consequence of control deficits (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Millan et al., 2012; Siegle et al., 
2007). For example, Gotlib and Joorman (2010) have suggested that depressed individuals’ 
difficulties in disengaging attention from negative stimuli, or forgetting such stimuli, could be 
caused by cognitive control deficits. This proposal has recently received empirical support 
(Everaert et al., 2017). Lowered levels of cognitive control increase and sustain depressive 
symptoms via their proximal links with emotion regulation strategies such as rumination 
(Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Research on cognitive control in 
depression has been focused on charting deficits in different cognitive control processes. Specific 
deficits in processes such as inhibition, shifting, and updating have been documented (Joormann 
& Tanovic, 2015). These deficits are commonly thought of as the lowered ability to inhibit 
certain thoughts or stimuli, shift attention away from them, or update the contents of working 
memory. However, it is important to note that not all accounts of cognitive impairments in 
depression postulate a reduced ability. For example, the cognitive-initiative account of memory 
in depression focuses on changes in initiative – a concept close to motivation – to explain 
memory impairments in depression (Hertel, 2000, 1994).   
In a recent analysis of theoretical models of cognitive control in depression (Grahek et al., 
2018) we identified three main conceptual problems in the field: (1) the use of descriptive models 
of cognitive control, (2) the reliance on describing the impairments instead of searching for 
mechanisms, and (3) the lack of integration between cognitive, motivational, and emotional 
impairments. These issues are hindering further progress in understanding how and why 
cognitive control is impaired in depression. In order to overcome some of the problems that we 
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have outlined in our earlier work, in this paper we propose an integrated framework that links 
alterations in motivational processes with cognitive control deficits. This framework allows us to 
move away from the view that cognitive control deficits in depression stem from a reduced 
ability to exert control. Instead, we will argue for a view in which the deficits arise as a result of 
altered expectations about the value of exerting control. 
Components of motivation in depression 
Cognitive impairments in depression are closely linked to impairments in emotional and 
motivational processes (Crocker et al., 2013). A wealth of depression research has focused on the 
relationship between cognitive and emotional processes. This approach has led to insights in key 
deficits related to the disengagement from emotionally negative material (Koster et al., 2011) and 
the ability to deploy cognitive control over emotional material (Joormann, 2010). While the 
processing of negative material and the presence of negative affect have been studied in relation 
to cognitive control impairments in depression, motivational deficits remain largely unexplored 
in this context. This is why we focus this paper on the link between motivation and cognition in 
depression. The links between motivation and cognitive processing of emotional material our out 
of the scope of the current paper. 
Motivation is goal-directed when effort is invested in order to bring about desired 
outcomes (Braver et al., 2014). Here we will focus on components of motivation that are relevant 
for goal-directed behavior because of their relevance for cognitive control processes. Motivated 
goal-directed behavior is flexible and sensitive to the current state of the individual and the 
environment. Two types of representations are crucial in driving this type of behavior: 1) action-
outcome contingencies, and 2) the value of potential outcomes (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; 
Dickinson, 1985; Wood and Rünger, 2016). Action-outcome contingencies represent the 
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probability that an action will result in a desired outcome. We will refer to these representations 
as outcome controllability (one’s estimate of their ability to control outcomes in an environment) 
and outcome value (the expected reinforcement - total reward and/or punishment - for reaching 
an outcome). The third concept that we will consider is effort, a variable that is central to the 
study of motivation. Effort represents the intensification of physical or mental activity needed to 
reach a goal (Inzlicht et al., 2018; Kurzban et al., 2013). This intensification comes with a cost, 
and we will refer to the effort requirements for reaching an outcome as effort costs. 
Goal-directed motivated behavior emerges with the integration of these three components. 
For example, imagine a person working long hours in order to get a promotion at work. This 
behavior is motivated and goal-directed because this person believes that working hard (high 
effort) will lead to the promotion (high outcome controllability), and the promotion is desired 
(high outcome value). As we review next, there is evidence that each of these three components 
of motivation can be impaired in depression (Barch et al., 2015; Griffiths et al., 2014).  
Outcome controllability 
The classic paradigm for investigating the role of outcome controllability in response to 
stressors was developed by Seligman and Maier (1967). They demonstrated that animals who 
were subjected to uncontrollable stressors (inescapable shocks) exhibited passivity, a 
phenomenon they referred to as learned helplessness. They found that controllable stressors 
(escapable shocks) did not induce learned helplessness. Overall, uncontrollable stressors were 
found to induce responses that resemble some of the symptoms of depression (Maier, 1984; 
Maier & Watkins, 2005). Further work by Maier and colleagues (2006) revealed that animals 
were able to detect the possibility of control over their environment. While animals have a default 
reaction of passivity when experiencing stress, this default response can be overcome by learning 
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that the stressors are controllable. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in rodents detects 
whether a stimulus is controllable and inhibits the default passivity in response to shocks. In this 
way, the ability to exert control over the environment serves as a protective factor against 
negative behavioral and physiological effects of stress (Maier & Seligman, 2016). Seligman and 
colleagues demonstrated that learned helplessness is also observed in humans, and suggested that 
it has significant relevance for understanding depression and related disorders (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Maier & Seligman, 2016; Seligman, 1972).  
The idea that environmental controllability is crucial for one’s health, security, and well-
being is supported by several other lines of research (Leotti et al., 2010). For instance, Moscarello 
and Hartley (2017) have recently proposed that goal-directed behavior is strongly influenced by 
estimates of agency. The authors propose that animals and humans infer their ability to control 
their environment by ascertaining the relationship between their actions and motivationally 
significant outcomes. These estimates are generalized and determine the probability of being able 
to exert control in a novel environment. Estimates of agency are used to calibrate ongoing 
behaviors. If the estimates of agency are high (i.e., high probability of being able to control the 
environment), goal-directed behavior is promoted. If the estimates are low, behavior is more 
likely to rely on an innate reactive repertoire. In this way, controllability of the environment, 
inferred from previous learning, is crucial for promoting either goal-directed or habitual behavior 
(Liljeholm, Tricomi, O’Doherty, & Balleine, 2011; Miller, Shenhav, & Ludvig, in press). 
Lowered estimates of outcome controllability, resulting in alterations of goal-directed behavior, 
could be an important factor in depression.  
Recent theoretical frameworks of depression also emphasize the importance of outcome 
controllability. For example, Pizzagalli (2014) has proposed a model of anhedonia in depression 
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in which stress plays a central role in the development of anhedonic symptoms. According to 
Pizzagalli, certain stressors, especially if they are uncontrollable, induce anhedonic behavior by 
causing dysfunctions in mesolimbic dopamine pathways crucial for motivated behavior. De 
Raedt and Hooley (2016) have argued that individual’s expectancies about their ability to cope 
with future negative events play a crucial role in depression. These expectancies are proposed to 
be formed based on previous coping experiences and are one factor that determines the actual 
ability to cope with stressors when they occur. Notably, these authors suggest that expectancies 
influence the ability to cope with stressors by modulating the proactive allocation of cognitive 
control prior to encountering a stressful situation. In sum, altered estimates of outcome 
controllability seem to be an important factor contributing to the levels of depressive symptoms. 
Outcome value 
Representations of outcome value are also strongly altered in depression. In recent years, 
motivational impairments in depression have received significant attention and a more fine-
grained view of these impairments is emerging (Pizzagalli, 2014; Treadway and Zald, 2013). 
Anhedonia is one of the two core symptoms of depression and is defined as a loss of pleasure in 
previously enjoyable activities or a loss of interest in pursuing them (DSM-5; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Anhedonia is a good predictor of antidepressant treatment success 
(Uher et al., 2012), the course of depression (Spijker et al., 2001; Wardenaar et al., 2012), and the 
time to remission and number of depression-free days after antidepressant treatment (McMakin et 
al., 2012). In spite of the importance of anhedonia in depression, the conceptualization and 
measurement of anhedonia has been heterogeneous and inconsistent (for a discussion see: Rizvi, 
Pizzagalli, Sproule, & Kennedy, 2016). Traditionally, anhedonia has been primarily viewed as an 
impairment in consummatory pleasure (i.e. liking rewards when they are obtained). However, the 
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evidence for impairments in consummatory pleasure in depression is mixed (Barch et al., 2015; 
Treadway and Zald, 2013). 
Animal models suggest that the mesolimbic dopamine system is selectively involved in 
reward motivation, but not in hedonic responses when rewards are gained (Haber and Knutson, 
2010; Salamone and Correa, 2012). These insights have stimulated research on anhedonia in 
depression and schizophrenia, revealing impairments in motivation that are not related to hedonic 
responses. As a result, an emerging, more nuanced account of motivation in anhedonia, 
emphasizes multiple reward processing deficits such as anticipation of rewards, reinforcement 
learning, effort expenditure, and value-based decision making (Barch and Dowd, 2010; Der-
Avakian and Markou, 2012; Pizzagalli, 2014; Romer Thomsen et al., 2015; Strauss and Gold, 
2012; Zald and Treadway, 2017). These deficits point toward changes in outcome value. They 
influence how outcome values are learned, anticipated, and translated into behavior. 
Depression is related to a number of reward processing deficits (for reviews see: Barch et 
al., 2015; Pizzagalli, 2014; Treadway & Zald, 2011). Converging evidence from self-report 
studies, behavioral tasks, physiological, and neuroimaging experiments suggests that depression, 
especially in the presence of anhedonia, is linked to reduced anticipation of rewards and impaired 
implicit reinforcement learning. For example, monetary incentive delay tasks (Knutson et al., 
2000) were developed in order to decompose anticipatory (e.g., the period after notifying 
participants about a possible reward) and consummatory (e.g., receipt of a monetary reward) 
aspects of reward processing. In these tasks depressed individuals, relative to healthy controls, 
display reduced behavioral and neural responses in anticipation of rewards (Pizzagalli, 2014). 
The literature on motivational impairments in depression suggests that depressed individuals, 
especially in the presence of anhedonic symptoms, assign value outcomes in a manner that differs 
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from healthy controls. This can be caused by anticipating lower payoffs and/or impaired 
reinforcement learning. 
Effort costs 
Another important factor influencing motivated behavior is effort that needs to be 
expended in order to reach a desired outcome. Effort involves the expected cost necessary to 
reach an outcome. This cost is weighed against expected benefits in order to choose which 
actions to pursue (Wallis and Rushworth, 2014). Reduced effort exertion is associated with 
multiple mental disorders (Culbreth et al., 2018; Salamone et al., 2016). Clinical studies have 
focused on the exertion of physical effort in order to obtain rewards, demonstrating that 
anhedonia in depression is related to reduced effort exertion (for an excellent review see: Zald & 
Treadway, 2017). In order to investigate this process, Treadway and colleagues developed the 
Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT; Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012), 
which involves having participants choose how much effort they want to expend in order to gain 
varying amounts of reward. Using this task, the authors have demonstrated that depressed 
individuals are less willing to exert effort than healthy controls (see also: Cléry-Melin et al., 
2011; Yang et al., 2014). However, the research on effort exertion in anhedonia and depression 
has largely been focused on physical effort while ignoring cognitive effort.  
Although cognitive effort has been an important topic of research for a long time 
(Kahneman, 1973), in recent years there has been an upsurge in cognitive and neuroscience 
research on this topic (Kool and Botvinick, 2018; Westbrook and Braver, 2015). More 
specifically, research on cognitive control has focused on the role of effort costs in decision-
making about control allocation (for a recent review see: Shenhav et al., 2017). Cognitive control 
processes require more effort than automatic ones, and effort needs to be expended in order to 
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override automatic processes in order to reach a goal. Research is starting to demonstrate that 
there are individual differences in the exertion of this type of effort (Westbrook et al., 2013). To 
date, there are not a lot of studies on cognitive effort in depression. However, a recent study has 
demonstrated the inverse relationship between depressive symptoms and a questionnaire-based 
measure of the willingness to exert cognitive effort (Marchetti et al., 2018). Also, the first 
experimental study of cognitive effort in depression revealed similar results to the results 
obtained with physical effort (Hershenberg et al., 2016).   
Cognitive control as a process reliant on motivation 
         Controllability, value, and effort of a desired outcome depend on previous learning. They 
have been studied extensively in the context of animal and human learning at both behavioral and 
neural levels (for an overview see: Daw & O’Doherty, 2014). The importance of these 
components of motivated behavior has also been recognized in other fields of psychology and 
neuroscience. For example, in social psychology the concepts of self-efficacy (Bandura, 2001, 
1977) and locus of control (Rotter, 1966) are closely linked to controllability. Also, concepts of 
feasibility and desirability of goals (Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001) correspond to the concepts of 
controllability and outcome value. Similar concepts can be found in psychology of motivation 
(Atkinson, 1957; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000) and work psychology (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). 
The role of motivation is now increasingly recognized in cognitive psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. 
Automatic or habitual responding can be suitable for a number of everyday situations, but 
for tasks that are more novel, uncertain, or complex, individuals need to engage cognitive control. 
This set of processes helps to overcome automatic response tendencies in favor of controlled 
modes of information processing and behavior. This allows for the coordination of our thoughts 
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and actions in accordance with our goals. Recent research has started to emphasize the role of 
motivation in the timing, intensity, and direction of cognitive control allocation. It is now 
recognized that the allocation of cognitive control is driven by goals and therefore closely linked 
to motivation (Braver et al., 2014). 
Reward prospect enhances cognitive control processes (for reviews see: Botvinick & 
Braver, 2015; Krebs & Woldorff, 2017). This effect has been observed on various tasks that tap 
into different components of control such as: attentional control (Padmala and Pessoa, 2011), 
response inhibition (Leotti & Wager, 2010), conflict adaptation (Braem et al., 2012), and task-
switching (Aarts et al., 2010). The effect is not restricted to situations in which reward is signaled 
by advance cues augmenting preparatory control processes. Comparable results are found when 
reward is signaled simultaneously with the target thereby promoting fast control adjustments 
(Krebs et al., 2010). But why is there a need to adapt control in the first place? Is it not the most 
optimal strategy to always exert maximal control over our thoughts and actions? The emerging 
answer is that exerting cognitive control carries intrinsic effort-related costs (Shenhav et al., 
2017). It has been shown that exerting control is effortful and that individuals tend to avoid it 
(Kool et al., 2010). Both reward prospect associated with an outcome, and the effort needed to 
reach that outcome are important factors in determining the way in which cognitive control is 
allocated. 
Another important factor in determining how cognitive control is allocated is the learned 
contingency between actions and outcomes. Although this factor has received less empirical 
attention, several computational models of cognitive control emphasize its importance. For 
example, the model of Alexander and Brown (2011) stresses the importance of predicting 
mappings between responses and outcomes in cognitive control. The model proposed by Shenhav 
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and colleagues (2013) posits that the allocation of cognitive control relies, among other factors, 
on the probability of an outcome conditional on the type and intensity of control. In this way, 
allocation of cognitive control depends on predictions about probabilities of certain actions (e.g., 
intense control allocation or a certain response) producing desired outcomes (e.g., solving a task 
correctly). 
Computational models of cognitive control 
The insight that cognitive control is closely related to motivation is formalized in a 
growing number of computational models of cognitive control. At present there are multiple 
theoretical and computational models which deal with the problem of how cognitive control is 
allocated (for recent reviews see: Botvinick & Cohen, 2014; Verguts, 2017). These models 
specify a set of components needed for optimal decision-making about control allocation and 
they are not mutually exclusive. Many of them include the representations of outcome value 
and/or outcome controllability (Brown and Alexander, 2017; Holroyd and McClure, 2015; 
Shenhav et al., 2013; Verguts et al., 2015). Also, many of these models assume that learning is 
crucial in forming these representations and emphasize the importance of learning for cognitive 
control (Abrahamse et al., 2016; Bhandari et al., 2017). Our framework relies on the current 
formulation of the Expected Value of Control (EVC) theory (Shenhav et al., 2013). This theory 
includes representations of outcome controllability, value, and cost in the decision-making 
process about cognitive control allocation. 
The EVC theory provides a normative account of cognitive control allocation as resulting 
from a decision-making process in which potential gains of control allocation are weighted 
against their costs (Shenhav et al., 2013). The theory postulates that these decisions determine 
how control is allocated across candidate control signals. These control signals vary on two 
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dimensions: signal identity, which determines the processes which are engaged (e.g., paying 
attention to the ink color in a Stroop task), and signal intensity which determines the amount of 
control allocated (e.g., how intensely to pay attention to the ink color). The theory proposes that 
control signals are selected in such a way that maximizes the expected value of control at any 
given moment.  
The EVC for a given control signal within a given state is determined by three 
components: efficacy, value, and cost. Efficacy is defined as the probability of a certain outcome 
given a signal of a particular identity and intensity, and the current state. In other words, the 
efficacy component can be described as the probability that certain outcomes will occur (i.e., that 
our actions lead to what we desire) or simply as action-outcome contingencies inferred from 
previous experience. In standard cognitive control paradigms, such as the Stroop task, an 
outcome can be a correct or an incorrect response on a particular trial. In this context, we can 
assign a probability to each of the two possible outcomes given each of the possible signal 
intensities and identities. Value is assigned to each of the possible outcomes and it represents the 
value of an outcome in terms of possible rewards or punishments associated with the outcome. 
The rewards can be both intrinsic (i.e., motivation to do the task well) and extrinsic (i.e., 
monetary rewards for good performance). Punishments can also come from multiple sources such 
as monetary loss or poor task performance. Outcome values are also modulated by the time it 
takes for the outcomes to occur, as individuals try to maximize reward rates (rewards per unit of 
time) and not rewards per se. Cost is defined as the expected cost associated with the specified 
intensity of control allocation. Within the EVC theory, cost arises as the property of the neural 
system. This means that as the intensity of a signal to allocate control becomes stronger, so does 
the cost of allocating control. In sum, the EVC is determined by the probability of an outcome for 
MOTIVATED CONTROL IN DEPRESSION   17 
 
a given control signal (efficacy), the value of that outcome, and the cost associated with control 
allocation.    
         At the neural level, the EVC theory was developed to explain the function of the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC). The theory assigns the critical role in decision-making about 
control allocation to this region. It is proposed that the dACC plays a key role in calculating the 
EVC and that the outcome of this process is then signaled to other regions which implement 
control, such as the dlPFC (Shenhav et al., 2016, 2013). The dACC is assigned a role in both 
monitoring for the changes in the environment relevant for control (rewards, punishments, errors, 
etc.), and, based on this, specifying which control signals maximize the EVC. 
The EVC theory provides a detailed and formal account of how cognitive control is 
allocated. One of the main advantages of the theory is its ability to integrate a wide range of 
behavioral and neural findings. The computational implementation of the theory has been shown 
to account for various effects associated with the allocation of cognitive control such as the 
sequential adaptation effects and post-error slowing (Musslick et al., 2015), including how 
individuals can learn about features of their environment that predict incentives for and demands 
of control allocation (Lieder et al., 2018). 
Proposed framework 
We propose a framework that integrates disparate areas of research: cognitive control 
deficits and motivational impairments in depression. This framework encompasses the 
controllability, value, and effort of outcomes in order to provide a more mechanistic 
understanding of these deficits. Furthermore, the framework emphasizes the crucial role of 
learning in the process of allocating cognitive control. In this way the framework allows for the 
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integration of motivational, learning, and cognitive control deficits in depression. We put forward 
direct links between components of motivation and reduced cognitive control in depression and 
propose how these links emerge through learning. In this way our framework offers a first step 
toward understanding how cognitive control deficits arise. In order to do so, we rely on the EVC 
theory which offers a computationally explicit model of cognitive control (Shenhav et al., 2013). 
This allows us to focus on the ways in which expected value of control might be reduced in 
depression, which results in allocating cognitive control with reduced intensity. We propose that 
cognitive control deficits in depression arise as a consequence of changes in the decision-making 
process about control allocation. These deficits in depression occur due to lowered expected 
value of control. The expected value of control relies on three components of motivation: 
controllability of outcomes, their value, and the effort needed to attain them.  
We argue that research on motivation in depression provides insights into mechanisms 
leading to a reduction in the expected value of control. The efficacy component in the EVC 
theory is closely linked to what we have termed outcome controllability - the estimates of the 
probability that actions will lead to desired outcomes. These representations are central in guiding 
motivated behavior (Moscarello and Hartley, 2017). As we have reviewed, there is emerging 
evidence that estimates of outcome controllability and beliefs related to controllability of the 
environment, are changed in depression. The value component in the EVC theory is related to 
what we have termed outcome value - the expected reinforcers following an outcome. We have 
outlined how reward anticipation and reinforcement learning are impaired in depression, 
especially in the presence of anhedonic symptoms (Treadway and Zald, 2013). The cost 
component in the EVC theory is linked to the cost of effort needed to obtain rewards. We have 
reviewed how this process is altered in depression. All of these components of motivation rely on 
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previous learning to estimate the probability of being able to exert control in a new environment, 
the value of outcomes in that environment, and the effort needed in order to reach them. These 
insights from the study of motivation in depression offer evidence for the reduction in efficacy, 
value, and cost of control. This leads to lower expected value of control which in turn results in 
reduced allocation of cognitive control (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The schematic representation of the proposed framework. Depression-related changes in the 
outcome value (e.g. reduced reward anticipation), outcome controllability (e.g. lowered estimates of 
controllability), and effort costs (e.g. reduced effort exertion), lead to the reduced value of control. This 
leads to the lowered amounts of control being allocated. The expected value of control (EVC) for a 
signal of a given intensity is calculated as the sum of the values of each possible outcome weighted by 
the probability of reaching that outcome for the given signal. The cost of allocating control is subtracted 
from that sum. The figure was adapted from Shenhav et al., 2013 with permission from the authors.    
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Without a doubt, estimates of controllability, value, and effort of outcomes, are formed 
through prior learning. Estimates formed in one situation are generalized and used in novel 
similar environments. For example, imagine a person who developed low estimates of 
controllability in the work environment. Over the years that person may have learned that no 
matter what they do in the work environment, it is unlikely that desired outcomes occur. That 
person will tend to allocate less cognitive control in that environment and will develop beliefs 
about the inability to do the job well. This will lead to a reduction in motivated behavior and will 
further strengthen existing low controllability estimates and beliefs. Alternatively, another 
individual might estimate high controllability in the same work environment. However, that 
individual can anticipate low amounts of rewards associated with achieving good results in work, 
or high amounts of effort needed to do so. That individual does not anticipate pleasure in work 
anymore and will also tend to allocate less cognitive control during work hours.  
Within our framework, depression-related deficits in cognitive control processes such as 
inhibition, task switching, or working memory updating (Joormann & Tanovic, 2015), can be 
conceptualized as products of changes in the expected value of control. In this way our 
framework integrates cognitive research on depression with impairments in other domains. Our 
framework outlines the links between cognitive control deficits and the study of motivation in 
depression. The framework can account for both the existing research findings and further 
develop the field by connecting these findings to previously unrelated literatures. Within our 
framework, cognitive control deficits in depression (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010) can be studied 
in relation with reward processing impairments in depression (Admon and Pizzagalli, 2015) and 
changes in perceived controllability of an environment (Moscarello and Hartley, 2017).  
This framework has several key implications. First, cognitive control deficits do not have 
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a single cause and can be caused by impairments in different processes. Deficits can thus be 
present in depressed individuals with different clusters of symptoms (e.g., mainly depressive 
mood or mainly anhedonia). Second, cognitive control deficits are causally related to reward 
processing impairments, effort costs, and estimates of controllability of an environment. These 
impairments influence allocation of cognitive control through learned estimates of reward 
probability, action-outcome contingencies, and needed effort. Third, cognitive control deficits are 
not a product of the simple reduced ability to exert control. They are a result of lowered 
expectations about the value of exerting cognitive control.    
The proposed framework goes beyond the current understanding of cognitive control 
deficits in depression. It does so by providing a more mechanistic understanding of such deficits. 
First, it identifies the three crucial components that give rise to these deficits. Second, it proposes 
that the three components play a crucial role in the lowered expected value of control which, in 
turn, leads to deficits in cognitive control. Further, we propose below how this mechanistic 
understanding can be used to derive model-based behavioral predictions, as well how it can be 
related to the neurobiology of depression.  
Simulation-based behavioral predictions  
The proposed framework outlines the three key motivational components which 
determine how cognitive control is allocated. By relying on a formalized model of cognitive 
control, the framework is able to generate precise predictions about the influence of each of these 
components on the behavioral performance in tasks which require cognitive control. In this 
section we describe how the computational implementation of the EVC theory can be used to 
make such predictions. This allows our framework to go beyond the currently existing data and 
make testable predictions that can be falsified or corroborated in future studies.  
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After the original formulation of the EVC theory (Shenhav et al., 2013), the more recent 
work has developed a computational implementation of the theory (Lieder et al., 2018; Musslick 
et al., 2015). In the computational implementation, performance of each task (e.g., responding to 
the color or to the word of a Stroop stimulus) is implemented as a process of evidence 
accumulation toward a decision boundary. Allocation of control can modify the parameters of 
this decision process (e.g. the rate of evidence accumulation) to improve performance, depending 
on the current goal and environment. This implementation relies on the drift-diffusion model of 
decision making, which has been widely used to describe decision-making (Forstmann et al., 
2016; Ratcliff et al., 2016), value-based choice (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Tajima et al., 2016), 
as well as cognitive control processes (Bogacz et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 1990; Dunovan et al., 
2015; Dutilh and Vandekerckhove, 2013; Schmitz and Voss, 2012; Ueltzhöffer et al., 2015).   
The computational implementation of the EVC theory (Lieder et al., 2018; Musslick et al., 
2015) has been successfully used to simulate a wide range of the existing empirical results in the 
domain of cognitive control (e.g. congruency effects, congruency sequence effects, task-
switching costs) and the influence of motivation on cognitive control (incentive-based 
enhancements in the processes such as inhibition, task-switching, and conflict adaptation). Here 
we use this model in order to provide behavioral predictions about cognitive control in 
depression. Specifically, we explore how the depression-related changes in the efficacy, cost, and 
value components should influence behavior on tasks that require cognitive control. These 
simulations, based on a model that predicts well the existing data in healthy individuals, provides 
clear predictions related to cognitive control allocation in depression.  
To demonstrate how control-demanding behavior is affected by changes in the decision-
making process about control allocation, we simulated the behavior of an agent across two 
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paradigms while varying parameters of that agent’s EVC-driven control valuation (Musslick et 
al., 2015; for a detailed description of these simulations, see Supplementary Materials). We first 
simulated performance in a Stroop task in which the simulated agent had to categorize a the ink 
color (e.g. red or green) of a color word (e.g. "RED" or "GREEN") on each trial (Stroop, 1935). 
We assessed the overall control allocation and the resulting performance cost associated with 
responding to a color that is response-incongruent with the word (e.g. "RED" displayed in green) 
compared to responding to a color that is response-congruent with a word (e.g. "RED" displayed 
in red). We also simulated behavior in a cognitive effort discounting (COGED) task, in which the 
agent must choose between performing a difficult, high-demand task for $2 and an easy, low-
demand (baseline) task for a variable amount of monetary reward on each trial. We assessed the 
subjective value of performing a high-demand task by measuring amount of monetary reward 
offered for the baseline task for which the EVC agent is indifferent between the two tasks, and by 
normalizing this amount by the reward offered for the high-demand task ($2). We evaluated how 
these complementary measures – of task performance vs. task preference – were influenced by 
changes in the agent’s (a) cost of cognitive control (b) sensitivity to reward, and (c) expected 
efficacy of exerting cognitive control (control efficacy). 
 Consistent with observations in healthy human subjects, our simulated agents 
demonstrated an incongruency cost, generating more errors when performing incongruent trials 
compared to congruent trials (Stroop, 1935). Critically, agents chose to exert less control (Fig 
1A-C), resulting in higher incongruency costs (Fig 1D-F) when they had (i) higher costs of 
control, (ii) lower reward sensitivity, and/or (iii) when they perceived their control as being less 
efficacious. The simulated agent also replicated the behavior of healthy human subjects in studies 
of cognitive effort selection, assigning lower subjective values to tasks that demanded higher 
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amounts of cognitive control (Westbrook et al., 2013). However, the subjective value for a given 
task decreased as (i) the cost of cognitive control increased, (ii) reward sensitivity decreased, 
and/or (iii) the control efficacy decreases (Figure 2G-I).  Interestingly, the influence of these 
changes in parameters are slightly magnified for high task difficulties compared to low task 
difficulties. 
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Figure 2. Effects of control cost, reward sensitivity and control efficacy on simulated behavior of the 
EVC model.  Behavior of the model was simulated in the Stroop paradigm and COGED paradigm (see 
supplementary Materials for details). (A-C) The amount of cognitive control allocated in a Stroop task is 
shown as a function of control cost, sensitivity to reward and expected control efficacy. (D-F) The error 
rate on incongruent and congruent trials is shown as a function of the three model parameters. (G-I) The 
subjective value of a task in the COGED paradigm is plotted as a function of task difficulty for different 
values of control costs, sensitivity to reward and control efficacy.  
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The computational implementation of our framework offers a possibility of studying 
cognitive control deficits in depression within the developing framework of computational 
psychiatry (Huys et al., 2016; Montague et al., 2012). Several computational frameworks have 
already started to model behavioral control in depression (Huys et al., 2015; Huys and Dayan, 
2009) and our framework offers the possibility of extending this research into the domain of 
cognitive control deficits in depression. Our framework provides a clear path forward by 
applying a normative theory of cognitive control to understand cognitive control impairments in 
depression. Further, it points to the crucial components which interact to produce control deficits. 
We have described the advantages of the EVC theory above, but we do recognize the importance 
of other related computational models of cognitive control. Outcome value, outcome 
controllability, and effort costs are being recognized as crucial in allocation of cognitive control 
across different models of control. Because of this, our review of the relevant literature, and the 
proposed framework, will be useful in guiding future research beyond the boundaries of the EVC 
theory. The further use of the computational models developed in cognitive neuroscience to 
understand cognitive control deficits in depression will advance the field in several ways. First, it 
will allow for the more unified understanding of cognition in both healthy and in individuals 
suffering from mental illnesses. Second, it will avoid the creation of models that are tailored 
specifically to understand cognition in depression. Finally, the application of these models to 
depression, and other mental disorders, will be able to inform and help improve the existing 
computational models of cognitive control.  
Neural Level 
Cognitive control deficits in depression are proposed to be related to functional changes in 
the dlPFC and the ACC (Disner et al., 2011). This view is based on the conceptualization of 
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cognitive control functions as reliant purely on the prefrontal cortex. However, this view has been 
challenged by the discovery of the role of other regions, such as the basal ganglia and 
corticostriatal loops in cognitive control and goal-directed behavior (for reviews see: Balleine & 
O’Doherty, 2010; Chatham & Badre, 2015; Haber, 2016). By building on the EVC theory, our 
framework offers a more specific view on the role of these two regions in depression. We 
propose that depression-related changes in the decision-making process about control allocation 
are related to the activity of the dACC. These changes can further result in lower levels of dlPFC 
activation which implements control based on the signals from the dACC. In this way, depression 
is not related to a lowered ability of the dlPFC to implement control, but related to changes in 
inputs to the dACC used in decision-making about control allocation. In line with the importance 
of the dACC in our framework, current research has pointed to the crucial role of the ACC in 
depression (Holroyd and Umemoto, 2016; McTeague et al., 2017), as well as to the specific role 
of the dACC (Goodkind et al., 2015). Our framework also points to the important role of efficacy 
and value representations which serve as inputs in the decision-making process. In this way, it 
can guide further research in connecting the role of the dACC and other regions and networks 
related to encoding value, reward processing, and efficacy (Haber and Knutson, 2010; Moscarello 
and Hartley, 2017; Treadway and Zald, 2011). 
Relationship with other constructs relevant for depression 
Lowered levels of cognitive control have a reciprocal relationship with negative beliefs 
and attributions. Negative beliefs about the self, the others, and the world represent a crucial 
cognitive vulnerability factor to depression (Beck, 1972). Attributions that are global, internal, 
and stable are also an important vulnerability factor (Abramson et al., 1989). Cognitive control 
deficits can strengthen those beliefs, but are also strengthened by them. Interestingly, there is 
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already some progress on studying the maladaptive beliefs within the framework of 
computational psychiatry (Moutoussis et al., 2017). Finally, lowered levels of cognitive control 
are related to maladaptive use of emotion regulation strategies such as rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008) which contribute to the onset and maintenance of depressive symptoms 
(Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014). Impaired cognitive control also affects other cognitive processes 
thus producing cognitive biases in attention, interpretation, and memory, which further promote 
the maladaptive use of emotion regulation strategies (Everaert et al., 2012; Gotlib and Joormann, 
2010). 
An important research line has focused on the relationship between depressive symptoms 
and cognitive control over affectively negative material. These studies have demonstrated 
specific impairments in shifting attention away from negative material, removing negative 
material from the working memory, and inhibiting negative stimuli (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010; 
Joormann and Vanderlind, 2014; Koster et al., 2011). In its current form, our framework does not 
focus on these deficits. However, we hope to integrate this body of work in the framework in 
future studies. One of the interesting possibilities for such integration is the influence of negative 
material on efficacy estimates through prior learning.   
Future directions and open questions 
The proposed framework opens novel avenues for research, namely the links between 
cognitive control in depression and alterations in components of motivation. Future studies in this 
domain can more directly test some of the implications of our framework. To date there are not 
many studies that have investigated the links between components of motivation and cognitive 
control deficits in depression. We hope that our framework will inspire more studies in this 
direction. Here we outline some of the existing evidence and propose the paradigms that could be 
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used in future research.  
Several studies have already demonstrated the importance of motivation for cognitive 
functioning in depression (Moritz et al., 2017; Scheurich et al., 2008). Recently, studies have 
focused on more specific components of motivation. For example, several studies have 
demonstrated that reward-based improvements in cognitive control and attention are related to 
depressive symptoms (Anderson et al., 2014; Jazbec et al., 2005; Ravizza and Delgado, 2014). 
Future studies should focus on precise distinctions between different types of impairments related 
to reward processing. In this context, we believe that reward anticipation and effort costs are the 
most interesting processes to investigate in relation to cognitive processes in depression. 
Depression research can rely on paradigms developed in cognitive science to study motivation 
and cognitive control (Botvinick and Braver, 2015). The study of effort expenditure is also 
gaining a great deal of attention and paradigms to study physical effort already exist (Treadway et 
al., 2012). For depression research, novel insights on cognitive effort (Shenhav et al., 2017) can 
be of particular relevance. Also, the relationship between anhedonic symptoms and cognitive 
control deficits in depression will be a crucial next step in better understanding cognition in 
depression. In this domain research should be guided by recent developments in measuring 
anhedonia through behavioral tasks and questionnaires (for a review on measures of anhedonia 
see: Rizvi et al., 2016). 
In the domain of efficacy, there are no readily available paradigms that could directly 
inform us about its relationship with cognitive control. However, developments in the field of 
learned helplessness suggest that the interactions between stress and controllability are crucial for 
stress regulation (Maier and Seligman, 2016). Recent research is starting to provide paradigms to 
study stress controllability in humans (Bhanji et al., 2016; Hartley et al., 2014). The critical next 
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step is to develop paradigms that would allow the investigation of cognitive control processes in 
relation to controllability. Recently, paradigms aimed to investigate different components of 
motivated action and learning have been developed in schizophrenia research. Using a novel 
paradigm, Morris and associates have demonstrated impairments in action-outcome learning in 
schizophrenia (Morris, Cyrzon, Green, Le Pelley, & Balleine, 2018; Morris, Quail, Griffiths, 
Green, & Balleine, 2015; see also: Liljeholm et al., 2011). The use of similar paradigms would 
allow for further work on computational models of motivation and cognition in depression. 
Recent computational work has demonstrated that generalization of learned action-outcome 
contingencies can account for a wide range of behavioral features associated with learned 
helplessness in animals and humans (Huys and Dayan, 2009; Lieder et al., 2013). However, there 
is a strong need for more empirical work which could precisely measure the importance of 
outcome controllability in depression. 
Cognitive control deficits (as well as anhedonia) are transdiagnostic in nature and co-
occur in many disorders (Goschke, 2014; Whitton et al., 2015). Although our model is focused on 
depression, the links between cognitive control and reward processing are relevant for other 
psychiatric disorders as well. Future studies in this domain hold the promise of not only detecting 
transdiagnostic constructs such as the positive valence and cognitive systems (Cuthbert and Insel, 
2013; Insel et al., 2010), but starting to investigate the relations between these systems. In this 
context, the relationship between reward processing (positive valence system) and cognitive 
control (cognitive system) across different clinical populations can be of great interest. 
In current research, depression is often regarded and measured as a single, homogeneous 
disorder and we have treated it as such in this paper. Importantly, diagnosis of depression 
requires only presence of one out of the two core symptoms: prolonged negative affect and the 
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loss of interest in previously pleasurable activities (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). A growing amount of evidence is pointing to the heterogeneous nature of depression and 
the need to analyze specific symptoms of depression (Fried and Nesse, 2015). Our framework 
emphasizes the possibility that cognitive control deficits in depression emerge from different 
causes. This allows for a study of how potential different causes of cognitive control deficits in 
depression can be related to different symptom clusters. For example, reward processing 
impairments, resulting in lowered levels of cognitive control allocation, can be related to 
anhedonic symptoms. In the same way, changes in efficacy estimates can produce control 
deficits, but they could be more related to the presence of negative affect. 
The study of mechanisms through which cognitive control deficits in depression emerge 
is of great relevance for developing future cognitive treatments for depression. While there is no 
evidence for the effectiveness of cognitive training in healthy individuals (Simons et al., 2016), 
cognitive trainings in depressed individuals are showing considerable promise (Koster et al., 
2017; Motter et al., 2016; Siegle et al., 2007). However,  the mechanisms through which 
cognitive trainings improve depressive symptoms remain unknown. Moreover, studies on 
cognitive training in depression have not focused on motivation yet. Understanding the 
components of motivation that are affected by these trainings, as well as including incentives in 
the trainings, will allow for more precise and individualized treatments. 
Conclusions 
         Cognitive control deficits represent an important vulnerability factor for depression and 
play a central role in cognitive impairments in depression. We propose a framework of cognitive 
control in depression in which these deficits emerge as a consequence of changes in the decision-
making process about control allocation. We argue that alterations in core components of 
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motivated behavior – reward anticipation, effort costs, and estimates of environment 
controllability – are crucial mechanisms contributing to dysfunctional cognitive control in 
depression. This view provides a more mechanistic understanding of cognitive control in 
depression, offers a better computational and neural understanding of the deficits, and connects 
cognitive research on depression with other fields of study such as motivation and agency. We 
believe that our framework can guide future research on mechanisms underlying depressive 
cognition which can result in improving treatments for depression.  
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 Supplementary Materials 
Simulations of control allocation 
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 In order to simulate the effects of motivational variables on control allocation we generated 
behavior from an agent that performs cognitive control tasks2 (Musslick et al., 2015). In these 
simulations, each trial is described as an interaction between the control system and the task 
environment. The agent specifies the optimal control signal based on an internal representation 
that is an estimate of the next trial (inferred state   ). The agent implements the specified control 
signal while performing the corresponding task in the actual task environment (actual state  ). 
After each trial, the agent updates the inferred state for the next trial based on its observation of 
the current trial. 
To generate response probabilities and reaction times we used a drift diffusion model (DDM, 
Bogacz et al., 2006; Ratcliff, 1978) that accumulates evidence towards one of two responses in a 
Stroop task (e.g. one response indicating the color green and the other response indicating the 
color red). The DDM simulates performance on a task as the accumulation of evidence about the 
stimulus towards one of two responses. The drift rate determines whether accumulated evidence 
leads to either the lower or the upper threshold (e.g. leading to either the left or right response 
button) and its magnitude determines how fast evidence is accumulated. The threshold 
determines the amount of evidence required to indicate a response, regulating the speed-accuracy 
tradeoff: higher thresholds lead to higher likelihood of reaching the correct response at the 
expense of slower reaction times (Ratcliff, 1985, 1978). We assume that the rate of accumulation 
toward one of the two response boundaries is governed by an automatic component and a 
controlled component 
  =          +             
                                                           
2 The source code for all simulations is available at https://github.com/musslick/EVCDepression 
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where the automatic component reflects automatic processing of each of the color and word of 
the stimulus that is unaffected by control: 
            =        +       
 The absolute magnitude of the color-response association       , as well as the magnitude of the 
word-response association       depends on the strength of the association of each stimulus 
feature with a given response and its sign depends on the response (e.g.        < 0 if the response 
is associated with the left button,        > 0 if response is associated with the right button). Thus, 
for congruent trials       , and       have the same sign, whereas the opposite sign for 
incongruent (conflict) trials. The controlled component of the drift rate is the sum of the two 
stimulus values, each weighted by the intensity of the corresponding control signal, one for 
processing the color dimension of the stimulus        and one for processing the word dimension 
of the stimulus      :  
          =          ∙          +       ∙       
Thus, each control signal biases processing towards one of the stimulus dimensions. As a result, 
higher control signal intensity for processing the color dimension of the stimulus improves 
performance – speeds responses and lowers error rates – for the Stroop task. Mean reaction times 
(RTs) and response probabilities for a given parameterization of drift rate on trial t are derived 
from an analytical solution to the DDM (Navarro and Fuss, 2009). 
In order to specify the optimal set of control signals   = {      ,       } on a given trial, the 
model estimates the expected value for each configuration of control signal intensities based on 
its internal model of the next trial    = {      ,       }. This is done by weighting the expected 
reward for an outcome against the cost associated with the chosen control signal configuration: 
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   ( ,   ) =   ∙   correct  ,     ∙  ( ) −     ( ) 
Where   corresponds to the expected efficacy of exerting cognitive control,    correct  ,     
corresponds to the probability of reaching the decision threshold for the correct response and 
 ( ) corresponds to the subjective value of responding correctly. Here, the subjective value 
 ( ) =   ∙   corresponds to the amount of reward offered for a correct response   weighted by 
the model's sensitivity to the reward  . The total cost of cognitive control     ( ) is computed 
as the sum of the costs for each control signal, 
    ( ) =   ∙       +   ∙      
where the cost for each control signal is an exponential function of the intensity of the control 
signal, scaled by the cost parameter  . The model selects the control signal configuration with the 
maximum EVC within the inferred next trial   , out of all the configurations under consideration: 
 ∗ ←            ( ,   )  
Performance in the actual state   is determined by the influence of the chosen control signals on 
the true parameters of the DDM (e.g., by adjusting the drift rate).  
Task environments 
Stroop Paradigm. To illustrate effects of distractor interference in the EVC model, we 
simulated behavior on a Stroop task. In this task, the model is presented with a two-dimensional 
stimulus, one dimension representing an ink color and another dimension representing a color 
word. On each trial, the EVC model is required to indicate the response associated with the ink 
color. The trial sequence encompassed 200 trials, half of which were response congruent and half 
of which were response incongruent. To simulate congruent trials, we set        = 0.1,       =
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0.33 such that both stimuli dimension promote the same response. On incongruent trials, we set 
       = 0.1,       = −0.33 such that the word dimension is associated with a different response 
than the color dimension. Note that the word-response association has a higher absolute 
magnitude than the color-response association, reflecting the assumption that word reading is a 
more automatic process than color naming. To simulate an expected mixture of congruent and 
incongruent trials, we parameterized the expected state as the average of the two trial conditions, 
   = {       = 0.1,        = 0}. Control was implemented in the form of two control signals, one 
for processing the color dimension and one for processing the word dimension. The range of 
control signal intensities as varied from 0 to 4 in steps of 0.02 and the reward received for a 
correct response was set to   = 40.  DDM parameters were set as follows: starting point = 0.0, 
noise coefficient = 1.0, non-decision time = 0.25s and threshold = 1.5. To demonstrate how 
control-demanding behavior is affected by changes in the decision-making process about control 
allocation we systematically varied the control cost parameter   from 0.5 to 1.5 in steps of 0.1, 
the reward sensitivity   from 0.5 to 1.5 in steps of 0.1 and the expected control efficacy   from 
0.1 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1 across simulations. Note that we varied only one parameter at a time 
while holding the other parameters constant at   =  1,   = 1,   =  1. For each parameter setting, 
we assessed the mean amount of control that the model allocated for each trial type, as well as the 
mean error rate. 
COGED Paradigm. To demonstrate the effects of changing model parameters on 
demand-avoidance, we simulated behavior in the cognitive effort discounting (COGED) 
experiment described by Westbrook & Braver (2015). In this paradigm, subjects can choose on 
each trial whether they want to perform a baseline low-demand task for a low reward or a higher-
demand alternative task for a higher reward. The amount of reward offered for the baseline task is 
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adjusted to identify the point of indifference, that is, the reward at which subjects are indifferent 
between performing the low-demand baseline task and performing the high-demand task. To 
simulate this paradigm, we modeled both tasks as different types of trials that the model can 
choose between. Each trial encompassed a stimulus with a color dimension that mapped to one of 
two responses with        > 0. However, unlike in the Stroop task described above there was no 
word dimension,       = 0. The difficulty of the high-demand task was manipulated across 
experiment blocks by varying the color-response association        from 0.2 to 0.4 in steps of 
0.0667 and the difficulty of the baseline task was fixed to        = 1 (higher color-response 
associations may reflect higher saturation values for a color patch).  For each set of simulations, 
we fixed the reward for the high-demand task to (  = 200) while steadily increasing the amount 
of reward offered for the low-demand task in steps of 1, beginning from an initial reward value of 
  = 1. On each trial, the EVC agent determined the highest EVC separately for each task and 
chose the task with the highest predicted EVC. We then assessed the amount of reward offered 
for the low-demand task for which the model would be indifferent between performing the low-
demand task and the (more rewarding) high-demand task and normalized this value by the 
amount of reward offered for the high-demand task. Following the notation by Westbrook & 
Braver (2015), we refer to this reward value as the subjective value of completing the high-
demand task. For instance, if the model would switch to performing the low-demand task at an 
offered reward of 120 then the (discounted) subjective value of the high-demand task would be 
120. The range of control signal intensities was varied from 0 to 6 in steps of 0.05 and DDM 
parameters were set as follows: starting point = 0.0, noise coefficient = 1, non-decision time = 
0.25s and threshold = 1.5. To demonstrate how control-demanding behavior is affected by 
changes in the decision-making process about control allocation, we systematically varied the 
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control cost parameter   from 0.5 to 1 to 1.5, the reward sensitivity   from 0.5 to 1 to 1.5 and the 
expected control efficacy   from 0.1 to 0.5 to 1.0 across simulations. Note that we varied only 
one parameter at a time while holding the other parameters constant at   =  1,   = 1,   =  1. 
For each parameter setting, we assessed the subjective value as a function of the task difficulty of 
the high-demand task.  
